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About a decade ago the philosopher Alisdair MacIntyre and the theologian Stanley 
Hauerwas noted: 
 
This is not the first time that ethics has been fashionable.  And history suggests 
that in those periods when a social order becomes uneasy and even alarmed 
about the weakening of its moral bonds and the poverty of its moral inheritance 
and turns for aid to the moral philosopher and theologian, it may not find these 
disciplines flourishing in such a way as to be able to make available the kind of 
moral reflection and theory which the culture actually needs.  Indeed on 
occasion it may be that the very causes which have lead to the impoverishment 
of moral experience and the weakening of moral bonds will also themselves 
have contributed to the formation of a kind of moral theology and philosophy 
which are unable to provide the needed resources. (1983, p.vii) 
 
And so it was that in the nineteen eighties, in Britain at least, there was  considerable 
evidence of a major demise in the academic study and teaching of philosophy.  Many 
departments were simply forced to close.  If the effects in the parent discipline were 
profound, the effects on sub-disciplines such as the philosophy of leisure, sport and 
physical education were magnified.   
 
Despite the philosophical flurry that accompanied the establishment of new degrees in 
leisure and related fields, during the period 1985-1995 there were only two full time 
appointments in Britain in philosophy of leisure, sport and Physical Education.  As the 
natural sciences have gained hegemonic ascendancy in our fields so philosophy has 
concomitantly been marginalised to the point where it is now almost extinct.  In Great 
Britain, only Bedford, Brighton, Cardiff , Cheltenham and Leeds (to the best of our 
knowledge) now employ philosophers in departments of leisure studies or management 
or, indeed, in departments of sports, Physical Education or Human Movement for that 
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matter.  And in this diminishing sphere, courses fall by the way side, post-graduate 
students are attracted by other fields and the downward cycle goes on.   
 
By contrast, in many spheres, not merely leisure, issues that can be captured under the 
umbrella term “applied ethics” are to be seen with increasing prominence in academic 
and professional journals and conferences.  But what makes these issues ethical, and who 
is left to investigate them as such, is precisely the point of MacIntyre and Hauerwas’s 
remarks.  The temper of our times is antithetical to philosophical reflection.  Yet it is 
precisely this temper that is both the source of its own evidence and the cause of renewed 
urgency.  The point of our brief paper today is to draw attention to the scope of ethics in 
leisure research (and therefore, by implication, teaching too) that is underpinned by 
philosophy and the rich potential it offers for academics in the next century.  We also 
highlight the kinds of research we are engaged in at Cheltenham. 
 
Our original intention was to offer a description of extant literature by searching the 
journal Leisure Studies and the various Leisure Studies Association Publications and 
give a classification of these in an attempt to systematise future discussion of ethics and 
leisure.  As with all theoretical plans empirical difficulties were not far away; it became 
apparent that the programme itself held too many intrusive presuppositions for us 
effectively to set about the classificatory task.  Dependent upon how the term “ethics” 
was interpreted almost everything and almost nothing might be included in leisure 
research.   
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“Ethics” and “ethics”  
Most of what is called "ethics", with a small “e”, is simply social science by another 
name.  We prefer to call it social scientific descriptions of ethically problematic practices, 
persons or policies.  Here researchers seek to describe that portion of the world that is 
ethically problematic by the received methods of social science; observation, 
ethnography, interview, questionnaire and the like.  Alan Tomlinson and Scott Fleming’s 
recent edited collection “Ethics, Sport and Leisure” (1995) is a good example of ethics 
with a small “e” (with the exception of Graham McFee’s introductory chapter).  The most 
common examples of “ethics” in leisure that spring up in casual conversations, as well as 
the academic literature, are matters of equity and/or of access (for example, racism or 
disability), deviant sub-cultures (for example, so-called football ‘hooliganism’), deviant 
practices (for example cheating, sexual abuse or doping) and so forth.   
 
What we call "Ethics", with a capital “E” by contrast, without elevating one above the 
other, is moral philosophy by which, briefly, is meant the systematic conceptual enquiry 
of questions regarding how we ought to live our lives.  This entails the analysis of central 
concepts such as duty, right, harm, pain, pleasure and promise within (often ignored) 
theoretical perspectives such as Contractarianism, Deontology, Utilitarianism, Virtue 
Ethics, Rights based Ethics and so forth.   
 
The distinction between “ethics” with a small “e” and “Ethics” with a capital “E” is, 
unsurprisingly enough, a contentious one.  It is conceived of differently according to how 
one understands the nature of “Ethics” itself.  Questions such as whether there are moral 
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facts; whether there is a clear distinction between facts and values; how the fact : value 
relationship is characterised; whether moral obligations override considerations of virtue 
and so on, are not answerable from outside a given theoretical perspective.  Something 
like this distinction is commonly drawn in moral philosophy as that between 
"descriptive" and "normative ethics".  But there are difficulties with a distinction that 
tries to distinguish one programme that sets out to describe the world from another that 
prescribes a programme for action.  The two are intertwined in complex ways.  Still the 
distinction need not be sharp to be important.  
 
Locating “Ethics” and “ethics” in Leisure Studies Research 
When we examined material published by the Leisure Studies Association (LSA) which 
might be deemed to be leisure “ethics” (small “e”) we found difficulty in identifying any 
single theme or topic which did not have ethical content when viewed from one or other 
of the philosophical perspectives listed above. In other words, the very exercise of 
attempting to classify work in this way proved the point about the ubiquity of ethical 
concerns. It also indicated that LSA publications, at least in the recent past, are 
overwhelmingly concerned with social science investigations into ethically problematic 
persons, practices and policies. Obvious examples under these headings include the 
following: 
 
Persons: - celebrity, sexuality and “tragic Magic” (Rowe 1993) 
  - rural deprivation and young women’s leisure (Prosser 1995) 
  - leisure and recreation for young delinquents (Tsuchiya 1996) 
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Practices: - sado-masochism as leisure (Geurtsen1993)  
  - sexual licence in night clubs (Brackenridge & Power 1993) 
  - responsible tourism (Hudson 1995) 
Policies: - community leisure and urban regeneration (Clarke 1991) 
  - welfarism and tourism development (Leslie 1992) 
  - gender, morality and the National PE curriculum (Hargreaves, 1995) 
 
Of course, less obvious examples can also be found: 
  - training for quality assurance (Barber 1991) 
  - sporting civic pride (Critcher 1992) 
  - the future role of the public sector in leisure (Ravenscroft 1992) 
  - organizational effectiveness (Papadimitriou 1993) 
All of the above, it can be argued, have latent, if not manifest, ethical implications which 
could be the subject of fruitful research. 
 
‘Traditional’ definitions of leisure (and play) are rooted in the notion of freedom from 
constraint (i.e. negative freedom) which is precisely why leisure is ethically problematic 
now: in other words, that “just doing what you like” leads, eventually, to severe moral 
conflicts. This is well known as the paradox of freedom: too much causes too little. And 
this is precisely why ‘serial killing’ is an example which might help us to (re)define the 
boundaries of leisure - it does not, in our book at least, qualify!  
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Looking amongst the same selection of publications at what might be considered from 
the big “E” ethics point of view very little, if anything, could be found, depending upon 
how we conceived “Ethics” itself. With very few exceptions, those pieces which, on the 
face of it, address Ethics, referring explicitly to such terms as ‘morality’, ‘deviance’ or 
even ‘Ethics’ per se, fail to address the philosophical content which might underpin and 
help to clarify such debates.  For example, Alan Clarke (1996 p.209) writes: 
There has always been an ethical core recognised in the study of leisure. This has often 
been an implicit code which nonetheless determines the position adopted by the writers. 
It is a version of a humanist code with a strong commitment to the utilitarian notions of 
maximising opportunities and minimising negative impacts on others.... 
 
There has been little concern shown for explicitly discussing the morality of leisure. 
(emphases added) 
  
Two points need to be made here. First, Clarke is absoutely right to point out the 
inescapable ethical background that is often taken for granted in leisure research. He falls 
short, however, in presupposing that “the morality of leisure” is a singular phenomenon.  
This interpretation is confirmed in his own conclusion. He writes: 
 
At the heart of these critiques [of theory and policy in leisure], I believe, there is a 
leisure ethic. It is a core which seems to approximate to the moral core found in the 
writings around the sustainability movement and the Agenda 21 declaration from the Rio 
Earth Summit.  (p.212, emphasis added) 
 
In the same book as Clarke’s piece, one of the authors (McNamee, 1996) highlighted an 
example of theoretical ethical conflict (between duty and virtue ethics) with respect to 
professional codes of practice.  This point is developed below. 
 
Ethics as Moral Philosophy 
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The question at the heart of the matter “how ought we to live our lives?” is a daunting 
one. How to justify and develop others into such forms of life we consider best is often 
perplexing and sometimes paralysing. But this is the task that is, however, working in the  
background of leisure professions and policy.  What makes this task particularly 
problematic is the fact that just what is to count as the terrain of morality is itself 
contestable.  How, then, are we to define a destination, or perhaps better, how shall we 
draw a map of territory whose contours and signposts shift under our theoretical gaze?  
(This does not lead us down the primrose path to postmodernism!) 
 
All this may seem trite or, worse, plain silly to the leisure professional. Surely, our 
intuitions would have it, morality is what morality is and that's the end of it. Perhaps, too, 
the sceptic might say 'all we need to do is to define our terms' and that's the end of the 
matter. No problem there. But to respond to the latter riposte it must be asked why, then, 
the floor of the philosophical ocean is scattered with the wrecks of rival moral theories 
such as naturalism, emotivism, utilitarianism - to name but three would-be contenders to 
the moral throne. And it is precisely the argument concerning the nature of morality, and 
ethical life generally, which is absent from much, if not all, leisure research that calls 
itself “ethical”.     
 
Charles Taylor (1989), Alisdair MacIntyre (1986) and Bernard Williams (1985) are 
prominent among those who have recently attempted to chart the moral topography of 
contemporary western culture. Although their theses differ in key respects, commonality 
can be found in their insistence that morality and moral theory is incomplete if it focuses 
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solely on the nature of our obligations. Like others, they decry the manner in which much 
contemporary moral philosophy has narrowly conceived its direction, importance and 
responsibility. Since Kant, much professional philosophy has tended to focus on what it 
is right to do rather than what it is good to be. 
 
Received wisdom has it that acting morally is related to certain principled obligations 
concerning what we should and should not do which are universalisable, that is, to be 
observed by all people in all places at all times where the situations are relevantly 
similar. We venture that under this description of ethics, leisure-related concerns would 
represent pretty much a null category.   
 
Williams, in contrast to what was until very recently received wisdom, argues that 
obligations ought to be viewed as merely one type of ethical consideration among others. 
MacIntyre argues similarly that we should return to the ethical ideal of living well as 
opposed to acting right. He offers an account of the good life which is greater in scope 
than what Williams (1985) refers to as the "peculiar institution" of morality”. Taylor 
(1989) too addresses himself to the question "what is it that makes life worth living?"  He 
outlines a cluster of notions which are central to ethical life: the respect for life, integrity, 
well-being and the flourishing of others. Even if the notions of duty, obligation and rights 
were constitutive of morality then we must also recognise that there are other demands 




These are questions about how I am going to live my life which touch on the issue of 
what kind of life is worth living, or what kind of life would fulfil the promise implicit in 
my particular talents, or the demands of someone with my endowment, or of what 
constitutes a rich, meaningful life. (1989, p.14) 
 
Under this broader description of ethics it becomes clear that leisure is clearly a matter 
for philosophical conjecture and, for that matter, always has been. Yet the extant 
literature has often progressed without a proper recognition of philosophical procedure 
and the wealth of writings on the nature of the good life itself. (See for example the 1996 
Sheffield conference on ‘Leisure and Quality of Life’.) Except in those cases where 
academics have attempted to situate the analysis of the concept of leisure itself in 
philosophical terms, the research has emerged relatively unscathed by philosophical 
analysis. 
 
Ethics and Leisure Related Research at Cheltenham and Gloucester 
 
The possibilities for Ethical and ethical research in leisure are manifold.  It would be 
fruitless to attempt to chart its full diversity. What we will do, however, is to share with 
you some of the projects that we have instigated with some collaborating institutions as 
examples of scholarship that ground leisure practice in moral philosophy. All the projects 
below attempt to combine ethics and Ethics. If we are to philosophise about leisure, the 
good life, human flourishing or evil for that matter masquerading as leisure, we can only 
do so within a framework that attempts to make sense of the phenomena under 
description. And that sense will be seriously impaired if it proceeds askew on matters of 
social description. Rather than hermetically sealing facts from values, serious 
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investigation in ethical aspects of leisure must start from a basis which begins “what are 
the attitudes and possibilities that can justifiably adopted in respect of this set of facts?”. 
Here are some examples where we have begun to ask this and other related questions. 
 
Sexual harassment and abuse: in particular, policies and codes of practice and conduct 
as these affect organisers, coaches and players of sport and/or service delivery in sports 
development and leisure management and the development of practical measures for 
minimising risk to participants and maximising organisational security (Brackenridge et 
al., 1995). 
 
Fair play: in particular, attempts to reconcile contractarianism and virtue ethics in 
sporting contests and investigations into specific “idiocultural norms” (Fine, 1987) in 
different international contexts (McNamee and Loland, 1996a). 
 
Coaching ethics: in particular, exploration of the relationships between children’s moral 
and legal rights and players rights more generally and the obligations that arise from 
those rights for coaches and organisations (McNamee, 1996; Brackenridge, 1987, 1994). 
 
Research ethics: including critical self-reflection for those of us engaged in what is often 
referred to as “sensitive” research (Lee, 1993; Brackenridge, 1996). One common 
scenario researchers find themselves party to is the uncovering and handling of 
incriminating information. This problematic scenario sometimes labelled “Guilty 
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Knowledge” (McNamee, 1996a) is not uncommon in ethnographic work and is likely to 
become more pressing if leisure studies develops research into “deviant” leisure. 
 
Conclusion 
We began with MacIntyre and Hauerwas’s quotation about the current vogue for ethics 
and the corresponding decay of the traditional sources of ethical reflection. In this very 
brief paper we have advanced only two points of significance. First, proper recognition 
needs to be made of the inescapably philosophical character of matters regarding the 
quality of our lives.  Leisure research cannot be hermetically sealed off from philosophy 
but can, and sometimes does, proceed ignorant of it.  Secondly, we must jettison once and 
for all the idea that the “ethics of leisure” or “leisure ethic” will be a unified 
phenomenon.  Just as the proto-sociologist of leisure 40 years ago may not have 
understood the complex contestation of interpretation, shaped by theoretical diversity, 
leisure researchers must be disabused of the idea that ethical reflection is uncontested or 
that such diversity as exists will be dissolved by the proper application of the methods of 
social science.  Moral life and philosophy just are messy. 
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